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when the sooner reward is smaller, then the decision is more com-
plicated. For example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 1, 
in which the heights of the bars represent the actual (undiscounted) 
value of two rewards and the curved lines depict their subjective 
(i.e., discounted) values as predicted by Eq. 1. The likelihood of 
choosing a particular alternative at any point in time depends on the 
relative subjective values of the two rewards. As may be seen, choice 
of the larger reward is more likely if the decision is made at an earlier 
point in time (e.g., at T
1
), whereas choice of the smaller reward is 
more likely if the decision is made later (e.g., at T
2
). Indeed, both 
humans and non-human animals show the preference reversals 
predicted by Figure 1 (e.g., Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981; Green 
et al., 1981, 1994).
The present study provides a systematic examination of choice 
between delayed rewards in pigeons and a test of the mechanism 
that is hypothesized to underlie such choices. In two experiments, 
the delays to the smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards were var-
ied, as was the amount of the smaller, sooner reward, while the 
amount of the larger, later reward was held constant. The amount 
of time corresponding to the delay from the choice point until the 
smaller, sooner reward (designated A in Figure 1) is common to 
both alternatives, whereas the delay from the choice point to the 
larger, later reward consists of the common delay plus an additional 
delay (designated B in Figure 1) that is unique to the larger, later 
reward.
The framework depicted in Figure 1, which implicitly assumes 
that choices are made based on comparison of the present subjec-
tive values of hyperbolically discounted outcomes, predicts that the 
IntroductIon
People and other animals often have to choose between an imme-
diate reward and another, larger reward of the same kind that is 
available only after a delay. When the delay to the later reward is 
long, a small amount of immediate reward may be chosen over the 
delayed reward, but if the delay is brief, then the choice may be to 
wait for the larger reward. This difference in preference is assumed 
to reflect the fact that the value of a delayed reward is discounted, 
with longer delays leading to greater discounting, and it is observed 
in both humans (Green et al., 1994; Kirby, 1997) and non-human 
species (rat and pigeon, Richards et al., 1997; Mazur, 2000; Green 
et al., 2004; monkey, Freeman et al., 2009). The decrease in the value 
of a reward as the delay to its receipt increases is well described by 
a simple hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1987):
V A kD= +( )/ ,1  (1)
where V is the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the 
amount of the delayed reward, and D is its delay. The parameter 
k governs the degree of discounting, with larger values indicating 
steeper discounting1.
Often, of course, the choice is not between an immediate and 
a delayed reward, but rather between two delayed rewards. If the 
sooner reward is also the larger one, choice is straightforward, but 
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subjective value of the larger, later reward should be discounted 
less steeply when the common period is longer, and indeed, this 
result was observed in humans by Green et al. (2005). To see why 
this is so, consider that according to Eq. 1, the subjective value of 
the smaller, sooner reward (V
S
) is given by
V A kDS S c= +( )/ 1  (2a)
and the subjective value of the larger, later reward (V
L
) is given by
V A k D DL L c u= + +( ) / ,1  (2b)
where A
S 
and A
L
 are the amounts of the sooner and later rewards, 
respectively, D
c
 and D
u
 are the common and unique portions of 
the delay to the later reward (see Figure 1).
It follows from the preceding two equations that the amount 
of the sooner reward that will be equal in subjective value to the 
later reward is given by
A A kD k D DS L c c u= +( ) + +( ) / / .1 1
Expanding the denominator, dividing both the numerator and 
denominator by (1 + k D
c
), and rearranging yields
A A k kD DS L c u= + +( ) { }/ / ,1 1
which may be rewritten as
A A k DS = +( )L u/ ,1 ′  (3)
where k′ = k/(1 + k D
c
). It may be seen that as the duration of the 
common delay, D
c
, increases, the value of the fraction k/(1 + k D
c
) 
decreases. Thus, Eq. 1 predicts that when the choice is between a 
smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later reward, discounting will 
be hyperboloid in form, and as the common delay increases, the 
parameter k′ will decrease, leading to shallower discounting. Note 
that whereas k governs the degree of discounting when subjective 
value is measured in terms of the amount of immediate reward, k′ 
governs the rate of discounting when subjective value is measured 
in terms of the amount of delayed reward (available at the end of 
the common delay).
Because the same equation (Eq. 1) fits delay discounting data 
from both humans and pigeons when choice is between an imme-
diate and a delayed reward, the question arises as to whether the 
extension of this equation to choice between two delayed rewards 
(represented by Eqs 2a, 2b, and 3) describes pigeon as well as human 
data. In two experiments, pigeons chose between smaller amounts 
of food available after a shorter delay and larger amounts of food 
available after a longer delay. An adjusting-amount procedure was 
used to estimate the amount of the smaller, sooner reward that was 
approximately equal in subjective value to the larger, later reward. 
The two experiments differed in how the common and the unique 
portions of the delays were signaled. In Experiment 1, pigeons’ 
choices between delayed rewards appeared to be quite different 
from humans, suggesting that quite different decision processes 
were involved. In Experiment 2, however, when signals were pro-
vided to facilitate discrimination of the common and unique por-
tions of the delay to the later reward, the pigeons’ choices were 
similar to those of humans in analogous situations.
ExpErImEnt 1
mEthod
Subjects
Five naïve, female White Carneau pigeons (numbered P15–P19) 
were individually housed in an animal colony room with a 12:12-h 
light/dark cycle. The pigeons had water and health grit continuously 
available in their home cages, and they were provided supplemen-
tal post-session food (Pigeon Checkers) to maintain their weights 
between 80 and 85% of their individually determined free-feeding 
body weights. The experiments were performed in accordance with 
relevant institutional and national guidelines and regulations, and 
were approved by the Animal Studies Committee of Washington 
University.
Apparatus
Two experimental chambers (Coulbourn Instruments, Inc.) were 
used, each measuring 28 cm long, 23 cm wide, and 30.5 cm high. 
The experimental chambers were enclosed within sound- and 
light-attenuating chambers equipped with ventilation fans that 
also provided masking noise during experimental sessions. A MED 
Associates interface and MED-PC™ software running on a personal 
computer located in an adjacent room were used to present stimuli 
and record responses.
Three response keys, spaced 8 cm apart, were mounted on the 
front panel of each experimental chamber. The right- and left-most 
keys (which could be transilluminated green and red, respectively) 
were 25 cm above the grid floor and 3.5 cm from the side walls of 
the chamber. The center response key (which could be transillu-
minated yellow) was 21 cm above the grid floor and mounted in 
the center of the front panel. A triple-cue light was mounted 6 cm 
above the center key, and could be illuminated red, yellow, and green 
(from left to right). A 7-W house light, mounted on the ceiling 
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Figure 1 | Hyperboloid discounting of smaller, sooner and larger, later 
rewards. The x-axis represents the time until a reward, and the y-axis 
represents its subjective value. The portion of the delay that is common to 
both the smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards is labeled A, and the portion 
of the delay to the larger, later reward that is unique is labeled B.
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the pigeon chose between an adjusting number of pellets that could 
be received after 25 s and 30 pellets that could be received after 28 s 
(again, plus an additional 0.5 s). For each pigeon, a unique-delay 
condition was terminated once the subjective value of the larger, 
later reward was determined. Once all the unique-delay condi-
tions within a common-delay condition had been completed, a 
new common-delay condition began. The order of common-delay 
conditions and the order of unique-delay conditions at each com-
mon delay (16 conditions in all) were varied non-systematically 
across pigeons.
In the first block of the first session of each condition, the 
amount of the smaller, sooner reward was one pellet. Within each 
session, the amount of the smaller, sooner reward was adjusted from 
one block of trials to the next in order to determine the amount of 
smaller, sooner reward that subjects judged equal in value to the 
larger (30-pellet), later reward. If a pigeon chose the smaller, sooner 
reward on both free-choice trials in a block, then the amount of 
smaller, sooner reward was decreased by one pellet for the next 
block of trials; if the pigeon chose the larger, later alternative on 
both free-choice trials in a block, then the amount of the smaller, 
sooner reward was increased by one pellet for the next block of tri-
als. Otherwise, the amount of the smaller, sooner reward remained 
the same for the next block of trials. The amount of sooner reward 
in the last block of trials of a session was used as the initial amount 
of smaller, sooner reward in the following session of the current 
condition.
Conditions were run for a minimum of 200 blocks and ended 
when a pigeon’s preference was judged stable, indicating that the 
smaller, sooner reward was equal in value to the larger, later reward. 
To assess stability, the last 50 blocks of trials were divided into 10 
groups of five consecutive blocks each, and both the overall mean 
amount of smaller, sooner reward for the 50 blocks of trials and 
the mean for each of the ten five-block groups were determined. 
Preference was considered to be stable when (i) none of the means 
of the 10 groups deviated by more than two pellets from the overall 
mean, (ii) neither the first nor the last of these 10 group means 
contained the highest or the lowest amount, and (iii) there was no 
upward or downward trend in the group means.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 shows the amount of smaller, sooner reward equal in 
value to the later 30-pellet reward (i.e., the subjective value of the 
later reward measured in pellets available at the end of the com-
mon delay) plotted as a function of the unique delay. The curved 
lines represent Eq. 1 with D equal to the duration of the unique 
delay. Table 1 shows the estimated k parameters (higher values 
indicate steeper discounting) and R2s for each pigeon. In the 0-s 
common-delay condition, in which pigeons were choosing between 
an almost immediate reward and a larger, later reward, discounting 
was comparable to that observed in previous discounting studies 
with pigeons (e.g., Mazur, 2000; Green et al., 2004). When the com-
mon delay was increased, however, pigeons discounted the value of 
the larger, later reward much more steeply. This finding is clearly 
inconsistent with the predictions of Eq. 3 and opposite to what has 
been observed when human subjects discount delayed hypothetical 
monetary rewards (Green et al., 2005); for humans, the degree of 
discounting decreased as the common delay increases.
of the chamber, provided ambient illumination. A food magazine 
was located below the right key and another magazine was located 
below the left key; in both cases, the bottom of the magazine was 
4 cm above the grid floor. Food pellets (20-mg pellets; TestDiet, 
Formula 5TUZ) were dispensed at a rate of one every 0.3 s. There 
was a 7-W light located inside each magazine to provide illumina-
tion during reinforcement and an infrared photo-detector to detect 
when a pigeon’s head entered and left the magazine.
Procedure
Pigeons were trained to peck the response keys, following which 
they were studied daily using a discrete-trials procedure in which 
each block of trials consisted of two forced-choice trials followed 
by two free-choice trials. Of the two forced-choice trials, one was a 
smaller–sooner-reward trial and the other was a larger–later-reward 
trial; which type of trial was first was varied randomly across blocks. 
Experimental sessions were conducted daily and ended either after 
40 blocks of trials or after 75 min had elapsed, whichever came first.
The beginning of all trials, both free- and forced-choice, was 
signaled by the illumination of the center yellow response key and 
the yellow cue light. On free-choice trials, a single response dark-
ened both the center key and the yellow cue light and illuminated 
the right (green) and left (red) side keys as well as the green and 
red cue lights. The red side key was associated with a larger, later 
reward (30 food pellets), and the green side key was associated with 
a smaller, sooner reward (an adjusting number of pellets). A single 
response on either side key darkened both side keys. If the left key 
was pecked, the green cue light was extinguished and the red cue 
light remained illuminated; if the right key was pecked, the red cue 
light was extinguished and the green cue light remained illumi-
nated. On forced-choice trials, only one side key and its associated 
cue light were illuminated; a single response darkened the key but 
not the cue light.
Pigeons experienced a delay to reinforcement on every trial. 
As depicted in Figure 1, the time until the smaller, sooner reward 
was the common delay (corresponding to A in the figure), and 
the time until the larger, later reward consisted of two intervals: 
the common delay plus a unique delay specific to the later reward 
(corresponding to B in the figure). On smaller–sooner-reward tri-
als, the green cue light and the house light remained illuminated 
until the common delay elapsed, at which point the right maga-
zine light was illuminated and an adjusting number of pellets was 
delivered. On larger–later-reward trials, the red cue light and the 
house light remained illuminated through the common delay and 
until the unique delay elapsed, at which point the left magazine 
light was illuminated and 30 pellets were delivered. The magazine 
light remained illuminated until 3 s had elapsed since the pigeon 
removed its head from the magazine, after which the magazine 
light was extinguished and the house light was illuminated. A new 
trial began 70 s after the pigeon had made its choice (i.e., pecked 
a side key) on the preceding trial.
The (common) delay to the smaller, sooner reward was either 0, 
3, 5, or 10 s, depending on the condition (plus an additional 0.5 s 
to allow the pigeon time to get its head down to the magazine; 
Mazur, 2000). Within each common-delay condition, there were 
four unique-delay conditions (2, 5, 10, and 25 s). For example, in the 
25-s unique-delay condition of the 3-s common-delay condition, 
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Caution is required, of course, before concluding that this dif-
ference in results between pigeons and humans represents a true 
species difference in decision making. For one thing, different pro-
cedures typically are used when studying different species. In the 
present case, the pigeons received real, biologically important rein-
forcers, and experienced the delays associated with their delivery on 
every trial, whereas in the Green et al. (2005) study, the participants 
neither received the reward nor experienced the delay, but rather 
were asked to imagine the choices they would make if the delays and 
rewards were real. It is unclear, however, how these differences could 
lead to opposite findings like the difference between the present 
results and those of Green et al. (2005).
Another notable difference between the human and pigeon 
procedures may be in the salience of the common delay. In one 
condition of the Green et al. (2005) study, for example, participants 
were asked to choose between a smaller amount of money available 
in 2 years and a larger amount available in 2 years and 6 months. 
Thus, the durations of both the common delay (2 years) and the 
Figure 2 | Discounting of the larger, later reward in the 0-, 3-, 5-, and 10-s common-delay conditions in experiment 1. Symbols represent subjective values 
(in pellets) for the four common-delay conditions. Curves represent the best-fitting discounting functions (Eq. 1).
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smaller, sooner reward, then when the common delay ended, the 
green cue light flashed once for 0.5 s and an adjusting number of 
pellets was delivered in the right food magazine. If the pigeon had 
chosen the left (red) key associated with the larger, later reward, 
then when the common delay ended, the red cue light illuminated 
for the duration of the unique delay, after which 30 pellets were 
delivered in the left food magazine.
In different conditions, the duration of the common delay was 
either 5, 10, or 20 s (plus an additional 0.5 s to allow the pigeon time 
to get its head down to the magazine). Within each common-delay 
condition, the durations of the four unique delays were the same as 
in Experiment 1: 2, 5, 10, and 25 s. All pigeons completed the 5-s 
common-delay condition first; three pigeons then completed the 
10-s common-delay condition followed by the 20-s common-delay 
condition; the other two pigeons completed the 20-s common-delay 
condition first followed by the 10-s common-delay condition. In 
addition, four SD/LD-signal conditions (two unique delays at a 
3-s common delay and two at a 5-s common delay) like those in 
Experiment 1 were interpolated among the CD/UD-signal condi-
tions. Each pigeon experienced the 16 experimental conditions just 
described in a unique order.
At the end of the experiment, each pigeon completed a final pair 
of conditions. The SD/LD-signal procedure was used in the first 
condition of the pair and the CD/UD-signal procedure was used in 
the second condition. For each pigeon, the durations of the com-
mon and unique delays used in this final pair of conditions were 
the same as in the last CD/UD-signal condition they experienced.
Results
Figure 4 shows the amount of smaller, sooner reward equal in value 
to the later 30-pellet reward (i.e., the subjective value of the later 
reward measured in pellets available at the end of the common 
delay) plotted as a function of the unique delay; the 0-s common-
delay condition from Experiment 1 is replotted for comparison 
purposes. Within each common-delay condition, the subjective 
unique delay (6 months) were specifically indicated. Even in a con-
dition where the choice was between a smaller amount available in 
2 years and a larger amount available in 7 years, participants could 
easily reframe the choice in terms of a common delay of 2 years 
and a unique delay of 5 years. In contrast, pigeons chose between a 
smaller reward available after a brief delay, signaled by one stimu-
lus (a green cue light), and a larger reward available after a longer 
delay, signaled by a different stimulus (a red cue light), and there 
was nothing to specifically signal the portion of time common to 
both delayed rewards.
It seemed possible that a difference in the salience of the com-
mon and unique delays between the human and pigeon experiments 
was responsible for the difference in the results. In Experiment 
2, therefore, we changed the stimuli to more clearly signal the 
common and unique delays. Specifically, the same stimulus that 
was present during the (common) delay until the smaller, sooner 
reward was also present during the initial (common) portion of 
the delay until the larger, later reward; on trials ending in a larger, 
later reward, a different stimulus signaled the final (unique) portion 
of the delay. Whereas in Experiment 1, different stimuli signaled 
the shorter delay and the longer delay (SD/LD-signal procedure), 
in Experiment 2, different stimuli signaled the common delay and 
the unique delay (CD/UD-signal procedure). Other aspects of 
the procedure, as well as the subjects, remained unchanged from 
Experiment 1.
ExpErImEnt 2
mEthod
Subjects and apparatus
The subjects and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was basically the same as in Experiment 1 with 
the principal exception being the way in which the common and 
unique delays were signaled (compare the SD/LD-signal procedure 
used in Experiment 1 with the CD/UD-signal procedure used in 
Experiment 2, as shown in Figure 3). In Experiment 2, regardless 
of which key the pigeon chose, the house light flashed twice per 
second throughout the common delay and then was extinguished. 
If the pigeon had chosen the right (green) key associated with the 
Table 1 | The estimated k parameter and the proportion of variance in 
subjective values accounted for by eq. 1 for each individual pigeon in 
each common-delay (CD) condition of experiment 1.
 Common delay
 0″ CD 3″ CD 5″ CD 10″ CD
Subject k R2 k R 2 k R2 k R2
P15 0.53 0.96 0.55 0.93 1.01 0.75 0.92 0.98
P16 0.76 0.95 2.14 0.79 4.60 0.28 4.48 0.00
P17 0.38 0.83 2.38 0.85 2.91 0.91 6.38 0.00
P18 0.92 0.86 3.40 0.21 6.56 0.72 4.95 0.10
P19 0.35 0.77 1.36 0.74 1.53 0.16 2.69 0.03
Values of the k parameter were estimated by fitting Eq. 1, with D equal to the 
duration of the unique delay, to the data from each delay condition.
30 pellets 30 pellets
Adjusting # pellets Adjusting # pellets
Common delay
Unique delay
Experiment 1:
SD/LD
Signal Procedure
R RG G
Experiment 2:
CD/UD
Signal Procedure
Red
Green
Red
Red
Figure 3 | Procedures for experiments 1 and 2. SD and LD refer to the 
shorter and longer delays to reinforcement; CD refers to the portion of 
the delay to the smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards that they have 
in common, and UD refers to the portion of the delay to the larger, later 
reward that is unique to that reward. The circles at the top 
represent the response keys (R = red; G = green), the rectangles represent 
the cue lights, and the light bulbs represent the flashing house light. 
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This decrease in k reflects the fact that in contrast to Experiment 
1, discounting in Experiment 2 became progressively shallower as 
the common delay increased. The difference between the results 
of the two experiments may be seen clearly in Figure 5, which 
shows the normalized areas under the observed subjective val-
ues (i.e., the area under the curve or AuC; Myerson et al., 2001) 
for each  common-delay condition in Experiments 1 and 2. Areas 
were calculated based on the observed subjective values depicted 
value of the larger, later reward tended to decrease with increases 
in the unique delay, whereas subjective value increased as the com-
mon delay was increased across conditions.
The curved lines in Figure 4 represent Eq. 1 with D equal to 
the duration of the unique delay. Eq. 1 tended to provide a good 
description of the individual data from each common-delay condi-
tion (median R2 = 0.86). As may be seen in Table 2, the k parameter 
decreased with increases in the common delay for each pigeon. 
Figure 4 | Discounting of the larger, later reward in the 5-, 10-, and 20-s common-delay conditions in experiment 2. The data for the 0-s common-delay 
condition are replotted from Experiment 1. Symbols represent subjective values (in pellets) for the four common-delay conditions. Curves represent the best-fitting 
discounting functions (Eq.1).
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the common delay in Experiment 2, reflecting a systematic decrease 
in the degree of discounting as predicted by Eq. 3, no such decrease 
was observed in Experiment 1.
Two types of replications comparing the CD/UD procedure intro-
duced in Experiment 2 with the SD/LD procedure of Experiment 1 
were conducted in order to establish whether the shallower discounting 
observed in Experiment 2 at longer common delays reflected an order 
effect or was the consequence of the change in how the common delay 
was signaled. In the first type of replication, subjective values for selected 
unique delays from both the 3- and 5-s common-delay conditions were 
re-determined for each pigeon, and in all cases, the replication closely 
matched the original determination from Experiment 1. In the second 
type of replication, each pigeon completed a final pair of conditions, 
both with either a 10-s or a 20-s common delay, the first of which used 
the SD/LD signaling procedure, followed by the CD/UD procedure. The 
results from these two conditions, as well as those from the preceding 
CD/UD condition, are depicted in Figure 6. For each pigeon, the sub-
jective values obtained using the CD/UD procedure were much higher 
than those obtained using the SD/LD procedure, demonstrating the 
powerful effect of explicitly signaling the common delay.
Figure 5 | Area under the discounting curve for each common-delay condition for each pigeon in experiments 1 and 2. Shallower discounting is indicated by 
higher values.
Table 2 | The estimated k parameter and the proportion of variance in 
subjective values accounted for by eq. 1 for each individual pigeon in 
each common-delay (CD) condition of experiment 2.
 Common delay
 5″ CD 10″ CD 20″ CD
Subject k R2 k R2 k R2
P15 0.11 0.92 0.08 0.86 0.02 0.64
P16 0.28 0.79 0.17 0.86 0.15 0.89
P17 0.47 0.95 0.25 0.93 0.03 0.65
P18 0.22 0.89 0.10 0.76 0.04 0.87
P19 0.11 0.79 0.04 0.73 0.01 0.35
Values of the k parameter were estimated by fitting Eq. 1, with D equal to the 
duration of the unique delay, to the data from each delay condition.
in Figures 2 and 4. Note that because they are normalized, AuC 
values can range between 0.0 and 1.0, with higher values indicating 
shallower discounting. Whereas AuC increased with the duration of 
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Equation 3 is a special case of the discounting model, based on 
the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis proposed by Green 
et al. (2005), which describes choice between delayed rewards in 
humans. According to this hypothesis, the k′ parameter in Eq. 3 is 
equal to k/(1 + k w D
c
), where the additional parameter w reflects 
differential weighting of the common delay. For humans, the 
value of w was less than 1.0, indicating that human participants 
placed less weight on the duration of the common delay than on 
the duration of the unique delay. In order to determine whether 
pigeons also underweighted the common delay, we compared 
the fits of Eq. 3 with k′ equal to k/(1 + k w D
c
) when the w 
parameter was fixed at 1.0 with the fit when w was free to vary. 
Making w a free parameter did not significantly improve the 
fit to group mean data [F(1, 14) < 1.0], suggesting that pigeons 
(on average) do not weight the common delay differently from 
the unique delay.
In order to determine whether Eq. 3, which has only a single k 
parameter, will suffice to describe the systematic change in the degree 
of discounting across all four (0-, 5-, 10-, and 20-s) common-delay 
conditions, this equation was fitted to the group mean subjective values 
from all of the common-delay conditions simultaneously. The propor-
tion of variance from all four common-delay conditions accounted for 
by Eq. 3 was then compared to variance accounted for by fitting Eq. 1 
(with D equal to the duration of the unique delay) to each condition 
separately. Notably, Eq. 3 accounted for 91% of the variance in the 
data, whereas a model with four discounting parameters (i.e., one for 
each common-delay condition) accounted for only 2% more of the 
same variance, a difference that was not statistically significant [F(3, 
12) = 1.30]. It is important to recall that even though Eq. 3 assumes a 
single underlying k parameter, it predicts the observed decreases in the 
degree of discounting because increases in the common delay produce 
decreases in the value of the equation’s k′ parameter.
Figure 6 | Subjective value of the larger, later reward in the final series of replications for each pigeon in experiment 2. CD/UD refers to the signaling 
procedure introduced in Experiment 2, and SD/LD refers to replications using the signaling procedure originally used in Experiment 1. Note that the common and 
unique delays were different for each pigeon.
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GEnEral dIscussIon
In two experiments, pigeons were given choices between two 
delayed food rewards, a smaller amount available sooner and a 
larger amount available later. In Experiment 1, the delay common 
to both rewards was not explicitly signaled. Compared to choice 
between an immediate and a delayed reward, the addition of a 
common delay resulted in an increase in the degree to which the 
later reward was discounted. In contrast, when the common delay 
was explicitly signaled in Experiment 2, the extent to which the 
larger, later reward was discounted decreased systematically as the 
common delay was increased. The fact that differences in the signal-
ing of the delays could have such a marked effect on the degree of 
discounting, even though the procedures were otherwise the same, 
highlights the important role that signaling plays in discounting in 
particular and reinforcement processes in general (Lattal, 2010).
comparIsons of dIffErEnt dIscountInG modEls
The pattern of shallower discounting with increases in the common 
delay observed in Experiment 2 is similar to what has been observed 
in humans (Green et al., 2005). It is inconsistent, however, with what 
would be predicted based on exponential or quasi-hyperbolic mod-
els of discounting. Exponential discounting assumes that the sub-
jective value of a delayed reward decreases by a constant proportion 
with the passage of each additional unit of time; quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting that the subjective value of a delayed reward is unaf-
fected by the passage of just a single time period, but decreases 
exponentially thereafter (Laibson, 1997).
If discounting were exponential, and people and other animals 
made choices between delayed outcomes by comparing their present 
(i.e., discounted) values, then the degree of discounting would be unaf-
fected by the duration of the common delay. Similarly, if discounting 
were quasi-hyperbolic, then once the time until the smaller, sooner 
outcome exceeded one time period, then the degree of discounting 
would be unaffected by further increases in the common delay.
In contrast, the present discounting framework, which assumes 
that choices are made based on comparison of the present subjective 
values of hyperbolically discounted outcomes (as instantiated in Eq. 
3), correctly predicts the observed pattern of results in Experiment 
2. As predicted, increases in the common delay resulted in decreases 
in how steeply the later reward was discounted as a function of 
the unique delay. As the time until the sooner reward (i.e., the 
common delay) was increased, the degree to which the subjective 
value of the later reward decreased, relative to that of the sooner 
reward, decreased. This decrease was reflected in the amount of 
sooner reward that was equivalent in subjective value to the later 
reward. Importantly, a mathematical model (Eq. 3) that assumed 
only a single, fundamental discounting parameter predicted the 
observed changes in the degree of discounting of the larger, later 
reward as measured in terms as the amount of smaller, sooner 
reward of equivalent value.
ImplIcatIons for spEcIEs comparIsons
The present effort provides a cautionary tale for those making 
species comparisons. What initially appeared to be a clear species 
difference (i.e., the addition of a common delay, which leads to 
shallower discounting in humans, led to steeper discounting in 
pigeons) turned out to be peculiar to the way in which the choice 
Discussion
In the present experiment, in which the common delay was explicitly 
signaled regardless of which alternative (i.e., the smaller, sooner 
or the larger, later reward) was chosen, adding a common delay 
tended to decrease the degree to which the larger, later reward was 
discounted. Indeed, the degree of discounting decreased systemati-
cally as the common delay was increased for every pigeon. A simple 
hyperbolic discounting model (Eq. 3) with only one free discounting 
parameter, predicted the observed changes in the degree of discount-
ing of the larger, later reward in all four common-delay conditions.
These results stand in contrast to those of Experiment 1, in 
which the common delay was not explicitly signaled and in which 
adding a common delay tended to increase the degree to which the 
larger, later reward was discounted. Why the addition of a com-
mon delay in Experiment 1 not only did not decrease the degree of 
discounting, but instead actually increased discounting, is puzzling. 
One possibility is that by making the delay to the larger reward 
even longer, the common delay made the signal for the larger, later 
reward (i.e., the red light) more aversive. Of course, adding a com-
mon delay also increased the delay to the smaller, sooner reward, but 
it is possible that, as is the case with observing stimuli, the stimulus 
that signals the longer wait to primary reinforcement is a condi-
tioned punisher just as the stimulus that signals the shorter wait 
is a conditioned reinforcer (e.g., Fantino, 1977; Dinsmoor, 1983).
Regardless of the mechanism underlying the extremely steep dis-
counting in Experiment 1, the difference between the results of the 
two experiments is clearly due to the difference in the stimuli that 
were associated with the common delay. This may perhaps be most 
clearly seen in the results of the final experimental manipulations 
(see Figure 6), in which the signaling procedure of Experiment 1 was 
reintroduced. In every case, this manipulation markedly increased 
the degree of discounting, which returned to its previous level when 
the signaling procedure of Experiment 2 was reinstated. These results 
suggest that pigeons’ discounting is controlled not just by the choice 
alternatives, but also by the way in which the choice is framed.
The effect of explicitly cueing the common delay in Experiment 
2 is reminiscent of the effect of explicitly cueing the post-reward 
interval on discounting in rhesus macaques (Pearson et al., 2010). 
In the monkey study, explicit cueing reduced the degree of dis-
counting relative to a condition in which the post-reward interval 
was uncued, again indicating that the way in which questions are 
framed may have significant effects on animals’ choices.
The question of major interest in the present study was whether 
the hyperboloid discounting model describes pigeons’ choices 
between two delayed rewards just as it describes humans’ choices. 
Indeed it does, at least under the conditions studied in Experiment 
2. This is not to say that there are no differences. Green et al. (2005) 
reported that humans, on average, underweight the common delay 
when choosing between two delayed rewards. In contrast, pigeons in 
the current experiment, on average, weighted both the common and 
unique portions of the delay to the larger, later reward equally. Taken 
together, the results of Experiment 2 reveal both similarities and dif-
ferences between discounting by pigeons and humans. Although the 
two species appear to differ in whether or not equal weighting is given 
to the common and unique portions of the delays, their behavior is 
similar in that when the common portion of the time until delayed 
rewards is increased, the degree of discounting decreases.
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 hyperboloid discounting model that describes human choices 
between two delayed rewards would also describe pigeon choices 
when both species are tested under somewhat analogous circum-
stances. And indeed, in Experiment 2, when the procedure used in 
Experiment 1 was modified so as to make more salient the variables 
that the model assumes control human discounting, the hyperbo-
loid discounting model did describe pigeon choices.
The present findings also demonstrate how research with human 
and non-human animals can be mutually informative and, as such, 
are consistent with the view that species comparisons can increase 
our understanding of human decision making (Hackenberg, 2005; 
Shettleworth, 2010). Although the results of Experiment 1 suggested 
striking differences between humans and pigeons with respect to 
their choice between delayed rewards, consideration of recently pro-
posed models of human discounting (Green et al., 2005) suggested 
critical procedural changes that were made in Experiment 2. The 
results observed with this modified procedure, in turn, revealed fun-
damental similarities between pigeons’ and humans’ choice behavior. 
More specifically, the present findings extend the generality of the 
hyperboloid discounting model and provide interspecies support 
for the hypothesis that choice between delayed outcomes is based 
on comparison of their hyperbolically discounted present values.
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was framed. That is, the way in which the common portion of the 
delays to smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards was signaled 
turned out to determine the way in which pigeons chose between 
delayed rewards. When the common delay was made more sali-
ent, pigeons’ choice behavior resembled that of humans choos-
ing between delayed monetary rewards, although the time scale 
differed by orders of magnitude. We would point out, however, 
that recent studies reveal that this apparent species difference in 
scale breaks down when the choices presented to human and non-
human animals are framed in more similar ways. That is, the sub-
jective value of directly consumable rewards declines over seconds 
in deprived humans (Jimura et al., 2009, 2011) just as it does in 
deprived non-human animals (Mazur, 2000; Green et al., 2004).
We do not contend, however, that these discounting rates are rep-
resentative of foraging in the natural environment (Stephens et al., 
2004), either for humans or other animals. For laboratory experi-
ments, researchers have designed tasks that allow them to examine 
discounting rates while holding the time between choice opportuni-
ties constant, regardless of how representative such situations are 
of those encountered in the natural environment. Discounting as 
observed under such circumstances is only one aspect of what deter-
mines choice behavior in the natural  environment, but it  presumably 
does play a role, and tasks like those in the present study are designed 
to allow examination of the discounting process in relative isolation.
The focus of the present study, however, was not on the role 
that discounting plays in foraging, although this is an important 
(and controversial) issue (e.g., Stephens et al., 2004; Kalenscher 
and Pennartz, 2008). Rather, the question here was whether the 
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